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ABSTRACT 
The Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is increasing in popularity as a cost 
effective and efficient means of making telephone calls via the Internet. 
However, VoIP may also be an attractive method of communication to 
criminals as their true identity may be hidden and voice and video 
communications are encrypted as they are deployed across the Internet. This 
produces a new set of challenges for forensic analysts compared with 
traditional wire-tapping of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
infrastructure, which is not applicable to VoIP. Therefore, other methods of 
recovering electronic evidence from VoIP are required. This research 
investigates the analysis and recovery of digitised human voice, which persists 
in computer memory after a VoIP call. 
This paper outlines the ongoing development of a software tool, the purpose 
of which, determines how remnants of digitised human speech from a VoIP 
call may be identified within a forensic memory capture based on how the 
human voice is detected via a microphone and encoded to a digital format 
using the sound card of a personal computer. This digital format is 
unencrypted whist stored in Random Access Memory (RAM) before it is 
passed to the VoIP application for encryption and transmission over the 
Internet. Similarly, an incoming encrypted VoIP call is decrypted by the VoIP 
application and passes through RAM unencrypted in order to be played via the 
speaker output. 
A series of controlled tests were undertaken whereby RAM captures were 
analysed for remnants of digital audio after a VoIP audio call with known 
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conversation. The identification and analysis of digital audio from RAM 
attempts to construct an automatic process for the identification and 
subsequent reconstruction of the audio content of a VoIP call. 
This research focuses on the analysis of RAM captures acquired using X-
Ways Forensics software. This research topic, guided by a Law Enforcement 
Agency, uses X-Ways Forensics to simulate a RAM capture which is achieved 
covertly on a target machine without the user's knowledge, via the Internet, 
during or after a VoIP call has taken place. The authors assume no knowledge 
of the technique implemented to recover the covert RAM capture and are 
asked to base their analysis on a memory capture supplied in the format of a 
file with a ‘.txt’ extension. The methods of analysis described herein are 
independent of the acquisition method applied to RAM capture. 
The goal of this research is to develop automated software that may be applied 
to a RAM capture to identify fragments of audio persisting in RAM after a 
VoIP call has been terminated, using time domain and signal processing 
technique, frequency domain analysis. Once individual segments of audio 
have been identified, the feasibility of reproducing audio from a VoIP call 
may be determined. 
Keywords: Computer forensics, digital evidence, electronic evidence, 
Voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP, Random Access Memory, RAM, Fast 
Fourier Transform, Frequency Domain analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Voice over Internet Protocol technology, called VoIP, is an attractive 
alternative to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) which may be 
appealing to criminals, because of (1) VoIP being a global telephony service, 
in which it is difficult to verify the user’s personal identification (2), the 
security of placing such calls, as many implementations use strong encryption 
to secure both the voice payload and control messages, and (3) monitoring or 
tracing such VoIP calls being difficult since conventional methods such as 
wire-tapping are not applicable to VoIP calls. Therefore, other methods of 
recovering evidence and information from voice over IP protocol are required. 
It is essential that forensic computing researchers devise methods to allow law 
enforcement agencies to overcome some of the aspects of this method of 
telephony that are advantageous to criminals.  
This research aims to develop automated software that may be applied to a 
RAM capture to identify fragments of audio persisting in RAM after a VoIP 
call has been terminated. An algorithm searches the RAM capture to identify 
audio like samples displaying a symmetrical pattern similar to human voice. 
Digital signal processing techniques are then applied to the suspected audio 
fragments for analysis in the frequency domain looking at the power spectrum 
of each sample. An introduction to digital signal processing techniques for 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(3) 
57 
forensic investigators is briefly discussed in section 3. 
Voice over Internet Protocol Stack 
This introduction provides an overview of the VoIP related protocols for the 
reader unfamiliar with this technology. VoIP is not a single protocol in itself 
but rather a collection of a number of co-existing protocols for the 
encapsulation and transport of voice packets over the Internet, referred to as 
the protocol stack.  
The Internet Protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981) is responsible for providing the 
internet addresses in its internet header allowing packets to be routed from 
their source to a destination IP address. The IP header format is shown in 
Figure1. 
 
Figure 1 – IP packet header format 
 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Postel, 1980) is an unreliable transport 
protocol because it does not guarantee delivery of packets. However, due to its 
simplicity and ability to transmit packets immediately after they have been 
created, UDP is well suited to the requirements of VoIP. A single packet may 
be measured in the order of 10s of milliseconds of audio and the human ear 
will not be able to detect the loss of packets until the threshold of human 
audibility is reached, an order of several 100 milliseconds. The UDP header 
format is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – IP/UDP stack showing the UDP packet header format 
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The research undertaken in this paper involves a series of experiments using 
the VoIP application Skype (2009) which makes use of the above mentioned 
protocols for Internet audio communications. To understand how human audio 
is converted to a packetised digital format contained within the payload of the 
IP packet, we briefly outline the common techniques employed in pulse code 
modulation (PCM). PCM is the technique whereby a digital value is assigned 
to the analogue value of a short sample of human audio.  
1.2 Pulse Code Modulation 
PCM is a technique used to digitally represent sampled analogue signals, to 
produce digital audio in computers and digital telephone systems. The 
frequency at which the analogue signal is sampled is termed the sampling rate, 
the number of times per second that a sample is taken. The quality of the 
sampled audio is determined by the sampling rate and the number of bits 
assigned to represent the digitised sample. The higher the number of bits the 
greater the accuracy of the digital representation of the analogue signal, often 
referred to as the bit-depth. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the digital representation of an analogue signal, in 
which the magnitude of the analogue signal is sampled regularly at uniform 
intervals, with each sample being assigned to the nearest value within a range 
of digital steps, referred to as quantisation. 
 
   Bits 
 Time 
Figure 3 – 4-bit quantisation of an analogue signal 
The original analogue signal, in this instance a sinusoid, depicted as the red 
curve, is sampled at regular intervals in time. The corresponding value for the 
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4-bit PCM quantisation is determined by using an imaginary vertical line on 
the time axis until it intersects the sinusoid and reading the digital value 
pointed at on the 'bits' axis with an imaginary horizontal line. The PCM value 
for the sample shown in the figure is '1101'. 
A technique called companding, commonly deployed in digital telephony 
systems is the act of applying compression to the analogue input signal before 
passing through the analogue-to-digital converter. Figure 4a shows an 
analogue signal prior to compression whereas Figure 4b shows the 
compressed signal. 
After compression, the analogue signal is digitised for transmission in a 
suitable format for VoIP applications. After the signal is transmitted across the 
Internet and received at the destination, it needs to be expanded to its original 
form.  
The International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) proposed recommendations on speech coding 
to standardise interoperability between telecommunications carriers resulted in 
the G.711 codec (ITU-T G7.11, 1972), which defines two main compression 
algorithms, A-law (Europe) and µ-law (U.S.A.). The choice of codec will be 
determined by the VoIP application if it is proprietary or may be chosen by 
the user from a list. 
 
 
Figure 4a – Original signal 
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Figure 4b – After compressing 
1.3 Defining Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics as d e f i n e d  b y  Beebe, Clark, Deitrich, Ko and Ko (2011) 
i s  the extraction of data from digital devices (e.g. personal computers, 
mobile phones, digital cameras, networking devices, web/file/email servers 
etc.) to reconstruct events, confirm or refute allegations of criminal activities 
and/or obtain intelligence information. Additionally, Yasinsac and Manzano 
(2001) define the digital forensic domain stating that digital forensics 
involves the analysis of electronic devices for the purpose of discovery and 
retrieval of information regarding the criminal use of technology. 
Within Australia, McKemmish (1999) defines digital forensic investigations 
with the use of a four-phase model to describe digital forensic investigations is 
widely cited and considered seminal research within the domain of digital 
forensics. The phases are defined as the Identification, Preservation, Analysis 
and Presentation (IPAP) of digital evidence.  
The results of activities performed upon digital evidence in order to retrieve 
information must be legally acceptable f or court proceedings. The legal 
requirements of digital forensics defined by Civie and Civie (1998) states: 
‘The pursuit of knowledge by uncovering elemental evidence 
extracted from a computer in a manner suitable for court 
proceedings.‛ 
Therefore the combination of both legal and technical requirements is required 
to demonstrate in court proceedings the phases of the digital forensics 
investigation, analysis and results in a manner acceptable in a court of law. 
Carrier (2003) introduces a scientific approach to the definition of digital 
forensics methods stating: 
‘The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward 
the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, 
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 20 40
A-law compressed 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(3) 
61 
interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence 
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or 
furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or 
helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to 
planned operations.‛ 
To this end, the research and development of the software tool described 
herein for the analysis and recovery of fragmented audio from a VoIP call 
cannot be referred to as ‘forensic’ based on the definitions above at this time. 
However, this paper will outline the achievements and worthiness of this 
software tool so far and its suitability as a tool to assist forensic investigators 
in the analysis of captured memory. 
1.4 Memory Acquisition 
Traditional forensics memory capture takes place whilst the forensic 
investigator is on-site, and performs the physical memory capture from the 
target machine to the investigator’s destination disk/image file system. The 
difference between ‘dead’ and ‘live’ acquisition is described below. 
 Dead Acquisition 
 
– Occurs when the data from a suspect system is copied 
without the assistance of the suspect operating system. 
 
– Historically, the term ‘dead’ refers to the state of only 
the operating system, so a dead acquisition can use the 
hardware from the suspect system as long as it is booted 
from a trusted CD or floppy. 
 
 Live Acquisition  
 
– Where the suspect operating system is still running and 
being used to copy data. 
 
– Acquisition tool needs to be able to access ‘open’ files 
(files in use) 
 
– Beneficial in circumstances where an encrypted data 
volume is mounted 
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– On a compromised system, there is the risk that the 
attacker has modified the operating system or other 
software to provide false data during acquisition.  
 
Imaging a computer's hard disk can be a lengthy process. During the 
acquisition process, if the forensic investigator saves the data to a file, he/she 
will have the choice of what format the image will be e.g. 
 A raw image contains only the data from the source device. Easy 
to compare the image with the source data. 
 An embedded image contains data from the source device and 
additional descriptive data about the acquisition. User inputted 
data, hash values, dates & times 
 Some tools will create a raw image and save the additional 
descriptive data to a separate file. 
As most forensic tools support raw images, the raw image it is the most 
flexible format. A freely available utility for most operating systems called 
‘dd’ (The Open Group, 2010) can make exact copies of memory that are 
suitable for forensic analysis without the need to own commercial forensic 
software packages. 
1.5 Why RAM Acquisition? 
Digital forensics tools play a vital role in reliably extracting information for 
analysis and presentation for industrial or legal purposes. These tools are 
typically used to investigate computer crimes, by identifying evidence that can 
be of probative value in a court of law. Digital forensics tools are rapidly 
becoming a substantial part of investigations all over the world, in both the 
law enforcement and private sector domains (Hibishi, Vidor, & Cranor, 2011). 
Efficient examination of digital evidence would not be possible without the 
use of digital forensic tools. While an understanding of the scientifically 
derived processes and the volatility of digital evidence is required by analysis 
teams and technicians, it is not feasible to interpret the volumes of evidence 
required for investigation on a given case manually. Both expert witnesses 
and digital forensic practitioners are reliant on a set of tools for interpreting 
digital evidence and to help bridge the gap of understanding between the 
technical details of digital technologies and the evidence presented to a jury 
in court (Schatz, 2007). Due to the vast and complex variety of devices 
required for analysis by digital forensics teams, there exist many different 
tools suited to handling each. These tools perform different roles including 
acquisition, examination and analysis. 
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The use of RAM captures is more easily explained in terms of the increasing 
sources of digital evidence complexity and the technological advancements in 
the volume size of storage media. Digital evidence complexity, the vast array 
of different digital evidence sources, each with their own ways of storing data 
and retrieving data increases the difficulty of forensic investigation. Similarly 
the volume of digital evidence, i.e. the amount of digital evidence required 
for practitioners of digital forensics to preserve, analyse and present in a 
given case is increasing exponentially. It is both a difficult and time 
consuming process to search and comprehend large quantities of digital 
evidence. These issues are supported by key researchers within the domain as 
pertinent issues for study (Casey, Gordon, & Leeson, 2005; Mohay, 2005). 
This may impact court proceedings due to increased case backlogs and the 
inability for digital forensic investigation teams to complete cases in a 
reasonable period.  
The current tools and techniques used to analyse digital evidence are not 
scaling and adapting to the increased data volume or complex array of devices 
now required for analysis with manual analysis remaining commonplace 
throughout the digital forensics industry.  
The Windows Forensics Analysis Tool Kit (Carvey, 2007) discusses remote 
response methodology, whereby a series of commands may be executed 
against a system across a network using a Windows batch file comprising the 
name or IP address of the target system and the username/password logon 
credentials. The batch file contains executable code, which can be copied to 
and run on the target system with the corresponding output saved in a file on 
the target machine. The only limitation to perform analysis of the target 
machine is the ability to remotely login to the target system via the network. 
This research introduces novel techniques and approaches with respect to the 
analysis of captured memory, required to address the key issues above 
resulting in Law Enforcement choosing ‘live’ RAM capture to minimise the 
complexity and volume of data to be analysed. 
1.6 X-Ways Forensics 
This focus of this research is on the analysis of the contents of RAM captures 
and as such it does not investigate memory acquisition techniques. No Law 
Enforcement Agency supplied RAM captures from a target machine, thus 
requiring the researchers to simulate a RAM capture, using X-Ways 
Forensics, computer forensics software, as shown in Figure 5. 
The option exists to capture an individual running process and the RAM 
allocated to that process e.g. VoIP application Skype, expanded in Figure 5b. 
However, to maintain the same conditions for each capture, the entire physical 
memory is captured, as show in Figure 5a. 
The X Ways Forensics RAM editor allows one to examine the physical 
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RAM/main memory and the logical memory of a process (i.e. a program that 
is being executed) where all memory pages committed to a process are 
presented in a continuous block. If one selects one of the listed processes, one 
may access either the so-called primary memory or the entire memory of this 
process, or one of the loaded modules.  
The primary memory is used by programs for nearly all purposes. Usually it 
also contains the main module of a process (the EXE file), the stack; and the 
heap. The “entire memory” contains the whole logical memory of a process 
including the part of memory that is shared among all processes, except 
system modules.  
 
 
Figure 5a – Entire RAM physical memory.    
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Figure 5b – Individual RAM processes e.g. Skype 
When one opens the local physical RAM, processes will be listed in the 
directory browser, even hidden processes, with their timestamps and process 
IDs, and their own respective memory address spaces can be individually 
viewed with pages concatenated in correct logical order as seen by each 
process.  
The purpose of this research is not to use the powerful capability of the X-
Ways Forensics RAM editor to reverse engineer captures and identify running 
processes, shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6– Byte offsets within a RAM capture for modules and objects. 
2 METHODOLOGY & EXPERIMENTS 
This research approach draws on the strengths of both quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches. This research focuses on outcomes that are of 
practical use, the creation of knowledge that advances digital forensics based 
on tangible and measurable results. This research strives for objectivity and 
measurability via controlled experiments using algorithms developed to 
pattern recognise human speech. 
2.1 Baseline Experiments 
X-Ways Forensics software was installed on the target Windows XP virtual 
machine initiating the VoIP call, and the capture taken after the VoIP call was 
terminated and the VoIP application closed down. The amount of RAM 
captured is 512MB. However, to reduce the possibility of false positives, 
identifying suspect audio fragments, which in fact are not audio and false 
negatives, failing to identify audio which is indeed fragments of suspect 
audio, the experiment shown in Table 1 was implemented.  
Table 1 – Initial results from RAM capture analysis. 
RAM  
Capture 
Detection Method Expected outcome Actual 
outcome 
Byte 
size 
Segments 
1 Visual inspection No audio Sinusoids 4096 24 
2 Visual inspection No audio Sinusoids 4096 24 
3 Visual inspection No audio Sinusoids 4096 24 
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The initial analysis technique involved displaying the byte values of RAM 
graphically, and visually inspecting the RAM contents. This is a time 
consuming process but produced some unexpected results. No audio was 
introduced to the system, however, a sinusoidal pattern with an amplitude 
offset was detected, in all three RAM captures tested and was repeatable. The 
authors believe this to be the Windows XP sound that is played at system start 
up shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 – Windows XP signature audio at start up. 
The audio segments found resembled those shown in Figure 8b whereas 
Figure 8a displays the similar sinusoid with no amplitude offset. This initial 
technique of creating baseline knowledge of the RAM contents before 
introducing known audio fragments and a VoIP call is essential.  
Direct current voltage (dc) is an electronics term to identify an offsetting of a 
signal from zero. This offset may be implemented in hardware such as a sound 
card.  
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Figure 8a – A sinusoidal signal.     
 
Figure 8b – A sinusoidal signal with amplitude offset. 
2.1 Introduce Known Audio 
The next round of experiments involved introducing a known audio pattern 
into the RAM contents, still without the introduction of a VoIP call at this 
time. The audio signal has been selected from the TIMIT Corpus (Garofolo, 
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Lamel, Fisher, Fiscus, Pallett, Dahlgren, & Zue, 1993) which provides speech 
data for acoustic phonetic studies. These are 16-bit, 16 KHz time aligned 
speech waveforms i.e. the byte locations within the waveform have been 
identified for each uttered word and the phonemes that constitute that word. 
The chosen phonetic sentence known as ‘LDC93S1W’ is single channel PCM. 
Five samples of audio extracted from the phonetic sentence, each 3000 bytes 
in size, were randomly inserted into a RAM capture using X-Ways hex editor. 
An example of one segment of the known audio is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 – An audio extract from the known phonetic sentence inserted into 
RAM. 
This experiment was repeated three times, each with a different ordering of 
the known audio and its location within the RAM capture. The results are 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 – The insertion of known audio pattern into RAM captures. 
RAM  
Capture 
Detection 
Method 
Known 
 audio 
sequence  
Expected  
outcome 
Actual  
outcome 
Byte  
size 
Segments 
1 Automatic 
algorithm 
A B C D E audio A B C D E 3000 5 
2 Automatic 
algorithm 
C A E B D audio C A E B D 3000 5 
3 Automatic 
algorithm 
D C E A B audio D C E A B 3000 5 
 
This set of experiments involved the detection of known audio segments 
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implanted into the RAM capture to test and develop an algorithm that detects 
the features of human audio. The inserted audio segments were all detected in 
the order in which they were inserted into the RAM capture. 
2.2 Introduce VoIP Call 
The following experiments consisted of using VoIP application Skype to make 
a VoIP call to the Skype sound test service. The call was then terminated and a 
RAM capture performed on the computer initiating the VoIP call using X-
Ways Forensics (2009). This was then repeated after the lapse of a 24-hour 
period whereby the laptop on which the RAM capture was performed, was 
powered down to allow the RAM contents to dissipate. 
Audio analysis tool, ESection (2010) was also used as the basis for the starting 
point in audio signal identification whilst performing VoIP calls. The VoIP 
calls were initiated and the RAM captured from inside a virtual machine (VM) 
using VMware (2009). The amount of RAM that is subsequently captured and 
analysed in the VM may be reduced The ESection software is operated 
externally to the virtual machine whilst running on the host machine 
supporting the virtual machine. This prevents the identification of audio 
within the RAM capture inside the virtual machine from being confused with 
the audio input at the microphone captured using ESection. Therefore all 
ESection audio captures saved on the host do not appear in the VM RAM 
capture 
The ESection capture allows us to further develop an algorithm based on the 
properties of the captured audio, magnitude and symmetry to identify the type 
of signal that should be searched for within the VM RAM capture as shown 
below in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 – Initial signed sinusoidal signal (x-axis: No. of samples, y-axis: 
Amplitude) 
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Several of the sinusoidal-like signals observed are believed to form part of the 
VoIP application dialling tones and not human speech. This is later confirmed 
by frequency domain analysis in Section 3. 
 
The ESection capture allows us to develop an algorithm based on the 
properties of the captured audio, magnitude and symmetry to identify the type 
of signal that should be searched for within the VM RAM capture as shown 
below in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 – ESection audio capture (x-axis: No. of samples, y-axis: Amplitude) 
This allows one to focus on the specific attributes of human speech within the 
ESection captured signal in order to implement an algorithm which can 
automatically search a block of computer memory. By close inspection of the 
properties of captured human speech such as changes in amplitude and 
symmetry, one can construct an algorithm that will exclude signals which do 
not show the typical attributes of digitised human speech such as symmetry 
and repetition of the waveform. 
The use of virtual machines allows a much smaller amount of virtual RAM to 
be captured e.g. 512MB as opposed to the order of Giga bytes. This may 
decrease the amount of human speech captured from the VoIP call but the 
purpose of this research is to demonstrate that suspected audio fragments may 
be human speech identified from analysis of a memory capture. The 
individual components of identified audio tend to be typically 4096 bytes in 
length and as such will require a sequence of these audio fragments to be 
reconstructed to form one continuous piece of human speech to form playable 
audio. 
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Suspected audio samples of digitised human speech are fragmented throughout 
the physical memory due to virtual address translation by the operating system 
shown below in Figure 12. The virtual address pages are linked to a page table 
entry (PTE) highlighted by the dashed line. The PTE contains the mapping 
from the virtual address to the physical address. This diagram highlights how 
three consecutive virtual pages of digitised human speech are mapped to three 
non-consecutive pages in the physical memory (Solomon & Russinovich, 
2005). 
 
Figure 12 – x86 Virtual address translation 
2.3 X-Ways Analysis  
The virtual machine consisted of a Windows XP operating system with the 
Skype VoIP application downloaded within it. A VoIP call to the Skype sound 
Test Service was made then the call was terminated. X-Ways forensic 
software, installed within the virtual machine, was used to capture the 512MB 
of RAM. Whilst the call was being made, ESection audio capture software 
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was also started on the host to record the audio input.  
This experimental setup allowed for the search of RAM as outlined above, in 
addition to this, the RAM was opened in the X-Ways hexadecimal editor and 
specific keywords were searched for e.g. Sound Test Service. Figure 13a 
shows an extract from the hexadecimal editor for search string ‘sound test 
service’, providing 237 hits. 
 
Figure 13a – X-Ways search hit for 'sound test service' 
The bytes immediately following the ‘sound test service’ string were plotted 
and produced an audio signal extract as shown in Figure 13b. 
 
Figure 13b – 4096 bytes immediately following search string (x-axis: No. of 
samples, y-axis: Amplitude) 
Using known Skype caller id as a search string also allows the call 
information attributed to the VoIP call to be extracted as shown below in 
Figure 13c, such as the caller identities in raw xml format, call initiator and 
timestamps. This is using X-Ways hex editor to view the captured RAM and 
perform string searches. Not only does the software tool search for audio 
fragments, it can retrieve information related to the VoIP call. 
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“RT INTO Messages 
(id,is_permanent,convo_id,chatname,author,from_dispname,gu
id,dialog_partner,timestamp,type,sending_status,body_xml,i
dentities,reason,participant_count,chatmsg_type,chatmsg_st
atus,body_is_rawxml,pk_id,call_guid) 
VALUES 
(164,0,30,'#david_t_irwin/$echo123;b4f208bd4c2c737c',
'david_t_irwin','davidirwin',x'61b6a47d0ab0894bca8bdb65
8307051d9bb9f2e42e126198a1aaeca2f68658fa','echo123',130590
1540,30,2, 
'<partlist alt=""> 
<part 
identity="david_t_irwin"><name>davidirwin</name></part> 
<part identity="echo123"><name>Echo / Sound Test 
Service</name></part> 
</partlist>', 
'echo123','',2,18,2,1,1160776592,'f1676bd45b6963ef2522d976d59b361
9');” 
Figure 13c – X-Ways extract of Skype VoIP call setup to Sound Test Service 
The use of a programmed search algorithm is more efficient than a visible 
search. A number of possible segments of human speech have been identified 
based on amplitude and symmetry and displayed on a single graph for the user 
to visually inspect for the difference between a pure or amplitude-modulated 
sinusoidal trace and that typical of human speech. This reduces the search 
space of a RAM capture to a single point of investigative analysis but none the 
less still requires human intervention in the form of visual inspection. Table 3 
indicates the number of suspect audio fragments detected from each VoIP call.  
Table 3 – VoIP call to Skype Test Call Centre made from inside virtual 
machine. 
 RAM  
Capture 
Detection 
Method 
VoIP  
Call  
Expected  
outcome 
Actual  
outcome 
Byte  
size 
Segments 
1 Automatic algorithm Skype dialing tone, 
automated voice 
& 
caller’s voice 
sinusoids & 
suspect 
human voice 
4096 48 
2 Automatic algorithm Skype 4096 46 
3 Automatic algorithm Skype 4096 53 
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It would not be an unreasonable question to ask 'why use the capture of 
memory for the purpose of obtaining audio, why not just capture the 
microphone input or speaker output directly'? 
The capture of computer memory allows information to be retrieved including 
specific information relating to the use of VoIP applications, such as call 
identifiers, user names, date and timestamps, the captured information may 
subsequently be used to testify to the authenticity of such a call having been 
made.  
The test of a known audio dissected into five segments of equal audio length 
and inserted into the RAM capture as outlined in 2.1 yielded all five segments 
being detected. Five segments are easily re-assembled into its original form 
visually. However, the amount of audio segments recovered from the VoIP 
call are significant and potentially three distinct sources, the VoIP application 
dialling tone, the automated answering of the call to the Skype test sound 
service and the caller. 
Dialling tones are easily identified using a signal processing technique called 
frequency domain analysis. A brief introduction to digital signal processing is 
discussed in section three however the removal of dialling tone still requires 
two separate call stream to be identified. This requires an additional algorithm 
to interrogate the start and ending bytes of each segment retrieved and attempt 
to find another once with which matches to form two separate streams of 
continuous audio. 
Similarly, one may ask the question “why focus on a RAM capture, without 
extending the search to a hard disk(s) as the contents of RAM are continually 
being swapped out from virtual memory to physical memory stored on the 
hard disk(s). The answer is simple; it wasn’t within the remit of the Law 
Enforcement Agency to require analysis of anything other than a perceived 
RAM capture represented as a file with a ‘.txt’ extension. However, the 
analysis techniques described in this research are easily extended to include 
analysis of the hard disk(s) and information and files related to the transfer of 
virtual memory pages to a physical location. 
3. INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING  
Although information stored in RAM is paged in Windows operating systems, 
the information within each page e.g. a fragment of human speech is ordered 
sequentially in time. Therefore all research until now has taken place in the 
time domain with graphical plots of signal samples on the y-axis appear as 
how they are digitised in time in memory. The main research theme is to 
demonstrate the ongoing development of an automatic audio search 
functionality to identify the fragments of human speech. 
Having identified a series of signal components from the RAM capture which 
exhibit a symmetrical pattern (Figure 13b) based on simple characteristics of 
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human speech displayed in Figures 9 and 11, one can further remove 
composite sinusoidal signals unrelated to human speech by processing the 
sampling values through a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and viewing the 
result in the frequency domain.  
A FFT is itself an algorithm for calculating the Discrete Fourier Transform 
(DFT) which decomposes a sequence of values, in this case, amplitudes of 
suspected audio fragments into components of different frequencies. 
For the purpose of drawing comparison, how do other files such as word 
documents or excel worksheets appear when graphically displayed in the time 
domain. The technique employed displaying the file on 50 graphs where each 
graph displays 4096 byes. Each graph has a different starting point within the 
file, e.g. graph 1 (top row, 1
st
 column) starts at 0 bytes and displays the first 
4096 bytes and graph 2 (top row, 2
nd
 column) starts at 1/50
th
 of the file length 
and displays the next 4096 bytes. This process is repeated for the fifty graphs, 
and with one click of a button, all graphs advance 4096 bytes. The word 
document shown in Figure 14 was visually inspected and contained no 
similarities to composite sinusoids or audio fragments. 
 
Figure 14 – Visual display of byte values for a word document. 
Based on the above visual inspection, no audio-like byte segments are 
detected and subsequently would not be passed to the frequency domain for 
analysis. Note that the document tested and one you are reading are the same 
document. 
Similarly for an excel document, the document tested was the one containing 
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the power spectrum plots and sinusoids and suspected audio fragments. Once 
again a visual inspection of the file contents displayed as a graphical plot of 
the bytes making up the file revealed no audio like fragments. 
The visual inspection of graphical memory displayed in Figure 14 was 
laborious and the first step in searching for audio like fragments to determine 
their properties for automatic algorithm development.  
3.1 Power Spectrum Analysis in the Frequency Domain 
For the purpose of this research, the programming code for the FFT has been 
extracted (and manipulated to suit) from Audacity (2011), a free cross-
platform audio editor developed by a team of software developers, translators, 
documentation writers. The Audacity application contains the function “Plot 
Spectrum”, which analyses a section of audio and converts it to a graph of 
frequencies against amplitudes using the FFT algorithm to provide a value for 
each narrow band of frequencies that represents how much of those 
frequencies are present. This research is based upon the code contained in the 
Audacity “Plot Spectrum” function to analyse the portions of RAM capture, 
which are suspected of being fragments of audio. 
The term, aliasing, is used to describe the effect of different signals becoming 
indistinguishable from each other. To counter the effect of aliasing, the FFT is 
used in conjunction with a Hann Window function, to process the suspected 
audio fragments in the time domain. The code for the Hann Window function 
is also extracted from Audacity, which allows a smaller subset of the 
suspected audio to be analysed, just as the name infers, applying an 
overlapping window, which traverses the original FFT input to produce the 
corresponding frequency domain output. 
The composite sinusoidal signal shown in Figure 10 produces a frequency 
domain plot as shown in Figure 15, highlighting its composition from more 
than one frequency. A periodic sinusoid would display as a single frequency 
component in the frequency domain. 
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Figure 15 - Frequency domain analysis (x-axis: Frequency (Hz), y-axis: Raw 
amplitude) 
The FFT transforms the time domain signal into a frequency domain 
representation of that signal. It generates a description of the distribution of 
the energy in the signal as a function of frequency. The vocal range of human 
speech varies from approximately 70 Hz to 7 KHz. However, most of the 
information conveyed in human speech does not exceed 4 KHz.  
The modelling of human speech and the pronunciation of vowels, shown 
below in Figure 16 indicates that the majority of the energy is concentrated 
below 4 KHz. 
Three different vocal tract shapes are shown corresponding, from top to 
bottom, to the vowels "ah" (/a/), "ee" (/i/), and "oo" (/u/). Plotted in the same 
graph for each tract shape is the spectrum. Note all three vowels have 
differing spectra due to the different vocal tract shapes. A variety of methods 
are being used to explore this mapping (Kawato, 1989; Saltzman, Munhall, 
1989; Jordan, 1990).  
Nyquist’s theorem states that the sampling frequency must be at least twice as 
high as the highest input frequency (4 KHz) thus a sampling frequency of 8 
KHz will allow the digitised voice to correctly represent the original signal. A 
pure sinusoid in the frequency domain will appear as a single spike, whereas 
the signal shown has 2 spikes at similar frequencies (440 Hz and 485 Hz) and 
also have a mirror image of itself (7515 Hz and 7560 Hz), with even 
symmetry around the centre point of half the sampling frequency, 4 KHz. 
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Figure 16 – Energy distribution versus frequency of human speech. 
The phenomenon of reflection around the point of half the sampling frequency 
for periodic signals is counteracted by the software via automatically 
removing the part of the spectrum for frequencies exceeding half of the 
sampling frequency. The resulting spectrum can now be compared against 
frequency domain plots of sections of human speech where most of the energy 
is concentrated below 4 KHz e.g. as shown in Figure 17. Signals that do not 
fall within the range of pattern representing human speech can therefore be 
removed. 
 
Figure 17 - Frequency domain analysis of speech (x-axis: Frequency (Hz), y-
axis: Raw amplitude) 
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The resulting collection of signals that remain after the removal of non-speech 
signals based on both time domain and frequency domain analysis are 
believed to be fragments of human speech which have been digitised after 
processing by the sound card. 
4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The techniques described in this research have been applied only to RAM 
captures. The RAM captures discussed in experimental setup have been 
forensically acquired using X-Ways Forensics. The research has aimed to 
introduce novel techniques for the analysis of physical memory such as 
graphical visualisation (albeit time consuming) and the development of 
automatic algorithms to identify possible audio fragments based on their 
symmetrical appearance.  
The use of visual inspection aimed to review the full RAM capture visually to 
avoid developing an algorithm that would detect false positives and omit false 
negatives. This was aided by the introduction of known segments into the 
RAM capture out with a VoIP call to test the detection properties of the 
algorithms. 
The use of digital signal processing techniques to view possible audio 
fragments in the frequency domain is also novel. However, this research is 
ongoing to develop further algorithms that will inspect the leading and trailing 
edges of the suspect audio fragments to see if they can be joined together to 
identify different call streams and form continuous segments of audio. 
Once segments of continuous audio have been reconstructed, it is anticipated 
that they would provide a high degree of probability that a particular 
individual has had access to a specific computer and made a VoIP call by 
matching their voice against the recovered audio from memory. 
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